IS THERE A SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY? ACCEPTANCE OF DEFEAT IN WAR
But once war is forced upon us, there is no alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's every object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war, there is no substitute for victory.
-General Douglas MacArthur, 1951 1 The United States has generally succeeded in achieving military victory over its enemies but, in recent decades, had less success in the completion and consolidation of victory in order to realize long term post-conflict objectives. An influential school of thought argues that this has been the case because the enemy has not thoroughly understood itself to have been defeated. But is this view correct? The acceptance of defeat argument repeatedly points to a few case studies. The World War II defeat, occupation, and reconstruction of Germany and Japan are widely accepted as successful and viewed as a model cases. This has been the case especially in light of recent difficulties and setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The World War I defeat of Germany and its aftermath, leading to the rise of Hitler and World War II, is widely held as a model of failure. The defeat of the Confederate States during the Civil War seems to contain elements of both success and failure. Because recent op-ed arguments about post-conflict success draw on these historical cases again and again, this paper will use them to examine the validity of the acceptance of defeat argument, and compare and contrast conclusions with the circumstances of the ongoing war in Iraq.
Key advocates of the idea that a successful post-conflict outcome hinges on our military adversaries understanding beyond any doubt that they have experienced defeat at the hands of the United States include Ralph Peters, Victor Davis Hanson, and Bing
West. Peters, a retired officer and author, insists, "It is not enough to materially defeat your enemy. You must convince your enemy that he has been defeated. You cannot do that by bombing empty buildings. You must be willing to kill in the short term to save lives and foster peace in the long term." 2 In The Soul of Battle, classical historian and military commentator Victor Davis Hanson describes the expeditions mounted by Greek
General Epaminondas, General William T. Sherman, and General George S. Patton as "marches to destroy the enemy's spiritual and material resources rather than the annihilation of his armies in the field per se." 3 Hanson argues that these punitive marches into the enemy's territory were crucial in bringing the war to the enemy populace, rendering them insecure, powerless, and demoralized-in short, acutely aware that they were defeated. In his assessment of the aftermath of Saddam
Hussein's fall and the seizure of Baghdad in modern day Iraq, retired officer and former
Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing West writes:
The Sunni Triangle had not suffered the destruction of war. The swift invasion had not touched the Sunnis. Before a person can be rehabilitated, he must acknowledge his wrongdoing or the hopelessness of persisting with his past ways. The Sunnis did neither. They felt they were the aggrieved party. The American Army, while heavy handed at times, was by historical standards restrained, making mistakes that encouraged the rebels while not imposing the draconian tactics that had suppressed many prior insurgencies. do his will. 5 Refining that a bit further, we may identify degrees of defeat, ranging from total defeat, where the enemy is compelled to do our will in every particular, to minimal acquiescence, whereby the enemy is prevented from imposing his will upon us through a military stalemate. US Army War College faculty member and historian J. Boone
Bartholomees writes about a theory of victory, which necessarily addresses the nature of defeat. "A conceptual scale of success runs from defeat through losing, not winning, tying, not losing, winning, and victory with shades and gradations between each point.
Victory is completely fulfilling while defeat is catastrophic, but other possible results contain aspects of both winning and losing to some extent." 6 Furthermore, defeat is not permanent, especially if not total. Today's defeat may come to be viewed very differently in the fullness of time, when it can be viewed in a broader context. This is an absolutely critical point. As Bartholomees notes, although World War I seemed like a decisive defeat of Germany and her allies in 1918, that verdict has been revised in light of subsequent events. 7 Military defeat is seldom either absolute or permanent.
Clausewitz identifies two "inseparable factors" in overcoming an enemy's resistance, the strength of will and the means of waging war. 8 These two factors are helpful in identifying conditions for defeat. The first condition is the loss of the will to resist or fight on, within the context of scope and objectives of the war (moral exhaustion). As with defeat, the loss of will may be total or a matter of degree. 19 Edelstein identifies three factors that make a successful occupation possible.
The first is acceptance by the occupied population of the need for occupation, usually because the defeated nation has been devastated by the conflict and wants help to sustain its people and to rebuild. The second is the perception by both the occupier and the occupied of a common internal or external security threat to the occupied nation.
The third factor is a credible guarantee of a timely end to the occupation. 20 "Despite the relatively successful military occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II,"
Edelstein writes, careful examination indicates that unusual geopolitical circumstances were the keys to success in those two cases." 21 The unusual circumstances were the "commonly perceived threat" of Soviet Communism. 22 This security threat had the effect of causing the occupied nations to welcome the occupying forces as protection against an external threat, buying the occupiers additional time to pursue their long term objectives. However, even the special circumstances generated by an external threat may be complicated by political, ethnic, or other divisions within the occupied nation. 23 So the school of thought that the acceptance of defeat by an enemy is critical to strategic victory is only one of several possible approaches to the question of how to achieve post-conflict success. We will proceed to examine the historical cases that resonate most strongly in contemporary American popular discourse.
The American South after the Civil War
The Confederate Congress adjourned in Richmond, Virginia for the last time on will to continue the war and called for an armistice. 31 The German people too were at a breaking point. The allied naval blockade had brought food short shortages and hardship. Labor strikes swept Germany, and the people appeared to be ready for Russian-style revolution. The Imperial German government collapsed and Kaiser
Wilhelm abdicated his throne as the revolutionary movement gained strength. However, the revolutionary movement produced no charismatic leader, and the Army's remaining leadership formed an alliance with the new provisional government against the revolutionary movements. 32 In the end, Germany experienced a partial revolution: one that changed the nature of government but did not drastically change the social or economic order, but the old order was overturned nonetheless. 33 For a people, an army, and a government that had gone to war in a frenzy of martial joy, this was the harshest of outcomes. What seemed a decisive defeat in 1918 evolved over time into something that looked much different. 36 If there was a time to consolidate victory over Germany, it ended as the im Felde unbesiegt and Dolchstoss gained ground and propelled the German into a state of anger, violence, and instability. 37 Saddled with a punishing, imposed peace settlement, the new German government proved unable to deal with the negative forces of unleashed by "military defeat, political revolution, and domestic turmoil." dead. 39 Hitler's primary Nazi subordinates were also either dead or in the custody of the Allies, awaiting trial for war crimes. Germany was overrun by invading armies, including the savage Russian onslaught in the East, and the German armed forces were virtually destroyed. The Allied forces were consolidating their positions, preparing for a large scale, long term military occupation and government. Moreover, the Allies were determined not to repeat the mistakes that followed World War I.
Was the German nation prepared to accept its defeat in World War II? Unlike
World War I, the Germans had experienced their military defeat first hand. Especially in the cities and industrial areas, German civilians knew that they had suffered as much as soldiers at the front, and, indeed, had suffered passively with little or no chance to fight back against the enemy. The physical devastation was so extensive that the people had to focus on basic needs and day-to-day survival. They had little appetite for agitation or even political activity of any kind. 40 The people were morally and physically exhausted.
The German armed forces were destroyed, their positions, camps, and bases overrun by the Allies. For a time prior to the German surrender, the Anglo-American leadership was concerned about the creation of a German "national redoubt" in the Alps, to be manned by the SS and other Nazi loyalists committed to fight to the death. 41 However, any last ditch resistance evaporated with the death of Hitler, and German soldiers laid down their arms and joined the civilian populace in the postwar struggle for survival.
The armed forces were morally and physically exhausted. With the surrender, the Nazi government ceased to exist, replaced by the Allies' military government. On the American side, this military government was planned and prepared for several years and was generally adequately resourced. The occupation governments in West
Germany were effective in fostering security, stability, and democracy, but, according to historian James M. Diehl, the role of the occupying forces was more indirect than direct.
The occupying forces were effective because they shielded and insulated the newly established democratic government from popular opposition and discontent.
Furthermore, the harsh Soviet rule of East Germany provided a strong negative contrast to the western zone, which had the unintended effect of promoting democracy and stability. 42 The German defeat was consolidated and extended by reasonably effective Anglo-American military government, the Marshall Plan, and the threat posed by Soviet communism. In summary, the German people, army, and government accepted their
World War II defeat more completely than they did after World War I.
Iraq after Saddam Hussein
The With Germany and Japan after World War II, the United States was able to achieve a combination of these factors that was sufficient to yield long term strategic success and stability. After the Civil War, the South was defeated militarily and the Union was permanently preserved, but the United States government was never able to The more expansive our post-conflict objectives, the more pessimistic we ought to be about the prospects for success. Future conflicts will continue to require that we kill our enemies and destroy their means of resistance, and it is satisfying to believe that we can punish an enemy's military, government, and people to the extent that they will accept their defeat and willingly submit to our post-conflict objectives. However, the evidence indicates that this is not likely. Absent an effective combination of the various factors that would appear to contribute to post-conflict success, simply punishing the
